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Appellant, 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 900482 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 14, 1990 
IS A FINAL ORDER 
The estate has taken the position that the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is not an appealable final judgment. 
A review of the pleadings in this case is helpful in determining 
whether the Order constitutes a final judgment. This action was 
instituted by the filing of a "Notice of Claim to an Elective 
Share." The Notice is filed pursuant to U.C.A. 75-2-201 and 
constitutes the only pleading presently before the court in 
behalf of Rose Hemmert. The District Courtfs Order conclusively 
denies Rose Hemmertfs claim for an elective share. In 
determining an analogous situation in a 1980 case, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
An Order which denies an application for 
intervention, with prejudice, does make final 
disposition of the claims and assertions of the 
applicant, and is therefore appealable . . . Where the 
denial of a motion to intervene, or any other final 
ruling or order of the trial court, goes unchallenged 
by appeal, such becomes the law of the case, and is not 
thereafter subject to later challenge. Tracy v. 
University of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 
1980) 
Respondent claims there are other issues which should be 
litigated before this appeal. The alleged remaining issues as 
identified in the Respondents Brief are identified and refuted 
as follows: 
(1) The validity of a Real Estate Contract between the 
deceased, Lyman Hemmert and Michael Hemmert needs to be 
determined. 
The single largest asset listed in the estate inventory is a 
Real Estate Contract whereby Michael Hemmert owes to Lyman 
Hemmert over $290,000.00 for the purchase of the Bushnell Motel 
in Brigham City. The validity of that Contract and the question 
as to amounts owing is a separate lawsuit, totally independent of 
Rose Hemmert's claim to elective share. While the determination 
of that question may affect the amount of money distributed to 
Rose Hemmert, it is clearly a separate lawsuit between the estate 
and the purchaser of the property. 
(2) Florida law may prohibit Rose Hemmert from receiving 
anything less than a fee interest in the residence she and Lyman 
Hemmert occupied in Florida. 
It is conceded that Florida statute appears to require that 
the surviving spouse receive fee title to the parties1 residence. 
However, this is a determination totally independent of the claim 
for elective share. In order to convey any title to the real 
property located in Florida, it will be necessary to complete an 
ancillary proceeding through Floridafs judicial system. The 
ancillary probate in Florida will distribute the Florida real 
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estate pursuant to Florida statute. Those proceedings will be 
totally independent of this appeal. 
(3) The validity of provisions in the deceased's Will 
concerning a social security set-off against Rose Hemmert's 
portion and disinheriting anyone contesting the Will should be 
determined. 
If the jury's verdict is upheld and Rose Hemmert is granted 
an elective share in the estate, then she takes independent of 
the Will. In that event both of these issues are moot. Judicial 
economy and a desire to limit the cost to the litigants argue 
that unnecessary litigation of these issues be avoided. There 
are no pleadings presently before the court concerning these two 
issues and, therefore, they do not affect the finality of the 
court's Order. 
(4) Rose Hemmert's portion of the estate may have already 
been exceeded by the widow's allowance she has been receiving 
since Lyman Hemmert's death. 
The fallacy of this argument is that the widow's allowance 
is not chargeable against any inheritance or portion of the 
estate ultimately distributed to Rose Hemmert. U.C.A. 75-2-403 
conclusively states: 
(2) The family allowance is not chargeable 
against any benefit or share passing to the surviving 
spouse . . . 
(5) The issue as to whether the dental benefits paid as 
widow's allowance to Rose Hemmert should be off-set against her 
portion has not been determined. 
This argument fails for the same reason as argument number 
4. Utah statute specifically excludes any type of family 
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allowance as an off-set against the widowfs portion of the 
distributive estate. 
The only issue plead by Rose Hemmert and currently pending 
before this court is the right to an elective share of the 
estate. The District Court's Order makes a final disposition of 
the claim of Rose Hemmert and is, therefore, appealable. 
II. 
THE ESTATE HAS TOTALLY FAILED TO ADDRESS THE CHOICE 
OF LAWS QUESTION RAISED IN THIS APPEAL 
The estate's Brief ignores the issues as framed in 
Appellant's Brief. It appears the estate is conceding the choice 
of laws question as outlined by Appellant. 
1. The estate has totally failed to respond to the 
prevailing legal approach which states that the validity of a 
contract is determined by the law of the location where it was 
made (lex loci contractu)• The estate has made no explanation as 
to why this approach should not apply in the present case. 
2. The estate has failed to address the most significant 
contacts theory. 
Appellant's Brief noted that an emerging number of 
jurisdictions have adopted the most significant contacts test in 
determining the validity and interpretation of contracts. 
Respondent's Brief fails to even address this theory. At page 12 
of its original Brief Appellant challenged the Respondent to 
compile a list of facts in the case which indicate the State of 
Florida has the most significant contacts with the Prenuptial 
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Agreement. Respondent has failed to accept that challenge. It 
is thus undisputed that Utah has the most significant contacts 
with this Prenuptial Agreement. Therefore, Utah law should apply 
as to questions concerning the validity of the Agreement. 
III. 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO EVEN ASSERT THAT THERE IS A 
"MARITAL DOMICILE" THEORY 
Respondent's Brief includes the following excerpt from the 
transcript of a hearing held in chambers immediately preceding 
the commencement of the trial. The speaker is Attorney Brian 
Florence, Attorney for the Respondent herein. 
. . . I have prepared for submittal to you an 
annotation from ALR 2nd, Volume 18, and two cases out 
of the State of Ohio - excuse me. One case out of the 
State of Ohio, 1966, and one out of Wisconsin from 
1959, which suggests that the place that the Prenuptial 
Agreement is prepared or executed is not a relevant -
is not the only relevant factor to consider in deciding 
which law should apply to its validity, but that the 
matrimonial domicile would be the law to determine the 
validity of the Prenuptial Agreement. (T8 L18-25, T9 
Ll-3) 
Respondents Brief fails to now even allege that there is 
such a theory of "matrimonial domicile." Respondent does not 
cite a case from Wisconsin and the only reference Respondent's 
Brief makes to the Ohio case is in reproducing a copy of the 
trial courtfs Conclusions of Law which cite the Ohio case. 
(Osborn)• It appears the Respondent has conceded that there is 
no such theory as the "marital domicile" approach. 
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IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE 
ONLY THE LAW, NOT ISSUES OF FACT 
Respondent contends that the trial court was correct in 
applying Florida law as to the validity of the Prenuptial 
Agreement. The only authorities cited by Respondent in support 
of this contention are five pages of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered by the District Court. One must 
conclude that the Respondent could find no higher authority to 
support the District Court's decision. Respondent is literally 
attempting to lift himself by his own boot straps. It is highly 
questionable whether the trial court's entry of Findings of Fact 
was even proper. 
As we have numerous times indicated the right of 
trial by jury is one that should be carefully 
safeguarded by the courts, and when a party had 
demanded such a trial, he is entitled to have the 
benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact; and 
it is not the trial court's prerogative to disregard or 
nullify them by making findings of his own. Mel 
Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 
917 (Utah 1979). 
It was the jury's prerogative to determine which 
evidence was to be credited and to draw reasonable 
inferences from that evidence, . . . of course we view 
the evidence in the light most supportive of the 
verdict. Sintron v. Milkovich. 611 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1980). 
Appellant concedes that Ceritos v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 
P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982) allows a trial court to make Findings 
following direction of a verdict. However, in order for those 
Findings to have any legitimacy, the legal basis for directing 
the verdict must be sound. In this case because the legal basis 
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for the trial court to apply Florida law in determining the 
validity of the Prenuptial Agreement was improper, the Findings 
of Fact entered by the court are absolutely worthless. They do 
not constitute any authority persuading an Appellate Court to 
uphold the September 14, 1990 Order. In reviewing questions of 
law, no deference is given to the trial court position. Grayson 
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law should be applied in determining the validity of 
the Prenuptial Agreement. The jury has, therefore, returned a 
legitimate verdict ruling that the Prenuptial Agreement is not 
valid. The District Court's Order and judgment setting aside the 
verdict should be reversed with instruction to the trial court to 
reinstate the jury verdict. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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